Progressive Collapse of Reinforced Concrete Frame Structure under Column Damage Consideration
Abstract
The research work is focused on progressive collapse analysis of reinforced concrete framed structure under column damage consideration using commercial software SAP2000. Nine story frame is selected and designed under gravity loads as per Pakistan Building Code. The frame is analyzed for progressive collapse under three damage cases; corner column damage, edge column damage and internal column damage. The frame is subjected to loading as described by General Services Administration (GSA) guideline for carrying out linear static analysis. The results include the variation of bending moment of beams and evaluation of demand capacity ratios(DCR) in the beams of the longer direction. The vertical deflections of the damaged joint are determined in cases with 0%, 40%, 60%, 80% and full damaged consideration. According to the GSA guideline atypical frame building having DCR values greater than 1.5 indicate more damage potential in the structural members. It is concluded that the edge column case with long bays is found critical because the bays with longer span have more damage as compared with smaller span bays. It can lead collapse of the frame in short interval of time and there is more possibility of loss of lives under such condition of structures. Based on this research it is suggested that the practicing engineer should incorporate the GSA guidelines for loading along with the other loads so that progressive collapse potential may be reduced up to some extent.References
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