Increasing Resistance Against Power Analysis Attacks Using Dual Key Scheme

Muhammad Uzair, Kashif Javed, Haroon A. Babri


Execution of a mathematically secure encryption algorithm on hardware is known to leak certain information to the side channels of the hardware. These side channels include current consumed from power supply and electromagnetic radiation emitted from cryptographic hardware. The information thus leaked can be utilized to mount an attack to reveal secret information about the algorithm (e.g. encryption key). This method of extracting the information is broadly classified as “Side Channel Attacks”. A type of side channel attack called “Power Analysis” utilizes the power/current consumed information as a source of information leakage. Several measures including “hiding” have been proposed to counter these attacks. These counter measures are based upon inserting randomness or consuming nearly constant current thus reducing the value of this information. In this research, we propose a new hiding countermeasure which uses dual keys to perform cryptographic operations. This method cannot be bypassed by increasing the number of traces.

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